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Abstract 24 
 25 
Discounting future costs and health benefits usually has a large effect on results of cost-26 
effectiveness evaluations of vaccination because of delays between the initial expenditure in 27 
the programme and the health benefits from averting disease. Most guidelines currently 28 
recommend discounting both costs and health effects at a positive, constant, common rate 29 
back to a common point in time. Published economic evaluations of vaccines mostly apply 30 
these recommendations. However, both technical and normative arguments have been 31 
presented for discounting health at a different rate to consumption (differential discounting), 32 
discounting at a rate that changes over time (non-constant discounting), discounting intra-33 
generational and inter-generational effects at a different rate (two-stage discounting), and 34 
discounting the health gains from an intervention to a different discount year from the time of 35 
intervention (delayed discounting). These considerations are particularly acute for vaccines, 36 
because their effects can occur in a different generation from the one paying for them, and 37 
because the time of vaccination, of infection aversion and of disease aversion usually differ. 38 
Using differential, two-stage or delayed discounting in model-based cost-effectiveness 39 
evaluations of vaccination raises technical challenges, but mechanisms have been proposed to 40 
overcome them. 41 
 42 
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 44 
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Highlights 46 
 Discounting often has a large effect on cost-effectiveness evaluations of vaccines. 47 
 Costs and health effects are usually discounted at a constant common rate. 48 
 However, alternative discounting methods may be normatively and technically 49 
justified. 50 
 51 
Abbreviations 52 
NICE: National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, WHO: World Health Organization 53 
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Introduction 55 
 56 
Economic considerations increasingly drive public investments in vaccines [1]. A key 57 
decision-making tool is economic evaluation, which weighs the incremental cost of 58 
vaccination against the incremental health and economic benefits that it brings. Since 59 
vaccines prevent future disease from occurring, the costs and benefits associated with 60 
vaccination usually fall at different times. Economists regard present consumption (see Table 61 
1 for definitions of terms in italics) as more valuable than future consumption, because (i) 62 
there is an opportunity cost to consuming now rather than later, since the money spent could 63 
have been invested elsewhere to generate some returns, and (ii) most people simply prefer to 64 
consume now rather than later, all other things being equal [2]. The standard approach to 65 
collectively capture these preferences for present over future consumption is by discounting, 66 
which reduces the value of future costs and benefits compared to those in the present [3].  67 
 68 
 69 
The most common method is to apply a constant (exponential) discounting rate, and to use 70 
the same rate for consumption and health. Constant rate discounting is supported by the 71 
Discounted Utility Model, which states that the utility derived from consumption at a future 72 
time t is the same utility now multiplied by a discounting factor (1+r)-t. However, this 73 
standard model of discounting has been challenged [4–10], particularly for the case of 74 
vaccines [11–16], since they have distinct characteristics not shared by many other health 75 
interventions and hence their cost-effectiveness can be particularly sensitive to discounting. 76 
In light of the importance of discounting to economic evaluations of vaccines, this paper aims 77 
to survey the methodological basis and merits of alternatives to standard discounting 78 
schemes, as well as to consider how they may apply to vaccination. We first review how 79 
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discounting is used in current economic evaluations of vaccination, then l ist the main features 80 
of vaccination that distinguish it from other health interventions. We explore how alternatives 81 
to the standard discounting model may address these features with respect to four key areas: 82 
differential discounting (discounting health at a different rate to consumption), societal 83 
preferences, inter-generational effects and the timing of health gains. Finally, we propose 84 
solutions to some of the technical issues that may arise with alternative discounting schemes. 85 
 86 
Review of discounting in economic evaluations of vaccination 87 
 88 
Methods 89 
 90 
We examined how discounting is used in economic evaluations of vaccination reviewed in 91 
six recent systematic reviews of economic evaluations of vaccines against human 92 
papillomavirus [17] (n=12); Streptococcus pneumoniae [18] (n=15), [19] (n=10); rotavirus 93 
[20] (n=17); Haemophilus influenzae type B [21] (n=13); and seasonal influenza [22] (n=18).  94 
 95 
Results 96 
 97 
In total 84 unique economic evaluations of vaccines published from 1993-2014 were 98 
examined (see appendix for details).  99 
 100 
Of these, 19 (23%) did not discount at all. These included 14 evaluations of paediatric 101 
influenza vaccination and two of pneumococcal conjugate vaccination [23,24] where the time 102 
horizon over which costs and effects are assessed was less than a year. The time horizons of 103 
less than one year and the lack of discounting were not inappropriate in most cases, as there 104 
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were no long term consequences to consider in the analysis. However, some of these 105 
evaluations included considerations of years of life saved beyond the time horizon, which 106 
would normally be discounted. One evaluation of rotavirus vaccination had a time horizon of 107 
five years, which the authors considered short enough to ignore discounting effects [25]. Two 108 
others (on Haemophilus influenzae type B [26] and pneumococcal conjugate vaccination 109 
[27]) had longer time horizons but gave no justification for failing to discount. A further 4 110 
(5%) discounted benefits alone (and not costs), while 11 (13%) discounted costs alone (and 111 
not benefits). 112 
 113 
Of the remaining 50 studies discounting both costs and effects, 43 (51%) used the standard 114 
discounting scheme of discount rates that are constant over time and equal for both costs and 115 
effects (with rates ranging from 3% - 6%). However, 1 (1%) used stepwise equal rates 116 
(reflecting United Kingdom Treasury recommendations [28], see section on “Non-constant 117 
discounting” for details) and 6 (7%) used constant rates but discounted costs at a higher rate 118 
than benefits. Of the studies with differential discounting, 5 of them reflected national 119 
guidelines (as the United Kingdom prior to 2004, the Netherlands and Belgium recommended 120 
differential discounting). However, one (set in France) did not, instead justifying the choice 121 
by appealing to the controversy over whether economic evaluations of vaccination should use 122 
equal discounting [29]. 123 
 124 
Of the 84 studies, 52 (62%) involved tracking a single age cohort. A further 16 (19%) tracked 125 
a range of age groups, but either only followed outcomes for a year or less, or did not 126 
consider the timing of outcomes at all. Of the remaining 16 (19%) studies that tracked 127 
multiple cohorts over several years, 8 were static or pseudo-dynamic models with no 128 
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interactions between effects in different cohorts. The remaining 8 were dynamic models with 129 
inter-cohort effects. 130 
 131 
Distinctive intertemporal features of vaccination 132 
 133 
Vaccination has several distinctive intertemporal features compared to most other health 134 
interventions. First, there are often long delays between vaccine administration (when costs 135 
are incurred) and disease averted (when benefits are obtained), so benefits are greatly affected 136 
by discounting. For example, vaccination against human papillomavirus [15] or hepatitis B 137 
[14] involves decades-long delays between initial costs and eventual benefits. In contrast, 138 
interventions without long-lasting effects (such as pain relief that provides immediate but 139 
short-term relief of symptoms) may be largely insensitive to discounting. 140 
 141 
Second, vaccines have positive externalities: they not only reduce disease risk in vaccinees 142 
but also provide “herd” or community-level protection to others who might otherwise have 143 
been infected by vaccinated individuals. The externalities are non-linear with respect to 144 
coverage: if a single individual is vaccinated, the health gain to others is small, but if most 145 
susceptible individuals are vaccinated, there is a substantial health gain to others. Herd 146 
protection from vaccination can persist for years, and indeed indefinitely in the case of 147 
eradication. Hence there can be delays between the earlier cost of vaccination and realisation 148 
of herd protection effects. Capturing these effects often requires multiple cohort models that 149 
stretch further into the future compared to models of non-infectious diseases.  150 
 151 
The interaction between time differences and generational differences can be complex. They 152 
are illustrated in Table 2 for four vaccines: 153 
8 
 
 154 
 Considerable expense was spent on smallpox eradication until it was achieved in 155 
1979. Today, expenditure on smallpox vaccination is virtually zero, but we continue 156 
to receive benefits from having eradicated smallpox (which was estimated to cost the 157 
world $1.35 billion a year in 1967 [30]). Note that even in the 1970s there were 158 
generational differences in benefits of vaccination: children were protected from 159 
disease, while their parents were already immune due to prior vaccination or 160 
infection. 161 
 Human papillomavirus vaccination protects current adolescents from future cervical 162 
cancer. It has a smaller effect on current adults because the vaccine is only 163 
prophylactic, and many of them have already been infected with human 164 
papillomavirus. Hence there are fewer inter-cohort effects, but time delays between 165 
costs (vaccination) and benefits (preventing cervical cancer) are important. 166 
 Varicella vaccination protects current children from varicella, and years later, protects 167 
them from zoster, a more severe disease caused by reactivation of varicella in people 168 
who have recovered. In current adults though, vaccination could actually result in 169 
higher zoster incidence [31]. Hence there are important inter-cohort effects, with 170 
benefits to cohorts receiving the vaccine but detriments to older cohorts. 171 
 Paediatric influenza vaccination directly protects children from influenza, and 172 
indirectly protects adults through herd immunity. In developed countries, children are 173 
the main influenza transmitters, but older adults are the most susceptible to influenza 174 
complications [32]. However, the present year’s influenza vaccine offers few benefits 175 
to either children or adults in future years, since the influenza virus will no longer 176 
genetically match the vaccine in the future. Hence there are important inter-cohort 177 
effects, but time differences are less important. 178 
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 179 
These inter-cohort effects change the nature of the decision problem. Non-infectious diseases 180 
are usually modelled with a single age-cohort only, because intervening in that age-cohort is 181 
not expected to bring important health effects to other age-cohorts. Hence a decision made 182 
for the present cohort would be equally valid to future cohorts unless conditions change. 183 
Equally, if it was reversed in the future it would simply return future cohorts to the status quo 184 
prior to the decision. In contrast, decisions about vaccines affect multiple cohorts over several 185 
years. Hence economic evaluations of vaccination are often based around transmission 186 
dynamic models which consist of several interacting age-cohorts in order to capture the inter-187 
generational externalities of vaccination [1]. 188 
 189 
Discounting health 190 
 191 
Future costs are often discounted at the social rate of time preference, which has three 192 
components [2,28,33,34]: (i) pure time preference or “myopia”, an individual preference for 193 
consumption now instead of later due to impatience, (ii) time preference due to uncertainty 194 
about the ability to consume in the future, and (iii) decreasing marginal utility of 195 
consumption, as economic growth causes future consumption to exceed present consumption. 196 
These effects relate to time preferences of individuals, but can arguably be extended to justify 197 
discounting societal investments [28,35]. From this perspective, the discount rate has been 198 
expressed as the rate at which society is willing to trade-off consumption today for 199 
consumption in the future. This can arguably be captured, for example, by the long-term 200 
interest rate on government bonds which measures the market rate at which the government is 201 
able to make this trade-off. 202 
 203 
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Health economic evaluations involve estimates of health effects as well as costs 204 
(consumption). Most health economic guidelines, including the Washington Panel on Cost-205 
effectiveness in Health and Medicine [36] and the World Health Organization (WHO) [35], 206 
recommend discounting both costs and health effects at an equal rate. Only three countries 207 
(Poland, the Netherlands and Belgium) recommend differential discounting in their base case 208 
[37]. WHO also recommend sensitivity analyses including discounting health at a lower rate 209 
than consumption [35] and using a non-constant discount rate when evaluating effects over 210 
long time-scales [38]. The UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 211 
initially recommended discounting health at a lower rate than costs, but switched to equal 212 
discounting in 2004 in a move that prompted robust debate [4,39].  213 
 214 
NICE have issued special discounting guidance in cases in which “treatment restores people 215 
who would otherwise die or have a very severely impaired life to full or near full health, and 216 
when this is sustained over a very long period (normally at least 30 years)” [40], initially 217 
recommending differential discounting and subsequently amending the guidance to an equal 218 
rate lower than the standard reference case rate. Paulden and O’Mahony have criticised these 219 
conditions (in their original application to differential discounting) as inconsistent and 220 
discriminatory, because they appear to exclude interventions that are preventive or which 221 
need to be maintained over time. Hence there are disease conditions where different 222 
interventions that decrease their impact (such as preventive and curative ones) would be 223 
evaluated with different discount rates [41].  224 
 225 
As previously discussed, discounting future health has a pronounced effect on vaccination 226 
because of the long delay between costs and benefits. Bonneaux has argued that this disparity 227 
may reflect the “law of cure” [42] or “rule of rescue” that, in McKie and Richardson’s 228 
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formulation [43], leads people to prioritise saving lives of identifiable individuals facing 229 
imminent death over “statistical lives” that can be saved through preventive measures like 230 
vaccination. McKie and Richardson suggest that “identifiability” may be defensible on 231 
utilitarian grounds because it supports “people’s belief that they live in a community that 232 
places great value upon life”, but is still a morally dubious criterion for discrimination. NICE 233 
has explicitly excluded using the rule of rescue as a decision making criterion [44].  234 
 235 
Equal vs. differential discounting 236 
 237 
Equal discounting of costs and health effects is supported by several arguments. One is 238 
Weinstein and Stason’s consistency thesis [45]: equal discounting ensures that two 239 
programmes initiated at separate times but with identical cost and health consequences (when 240 
measured over the same period of time following initiation) receive equal priority when the 241 
value of health is constant over time. Williams [46] elucidates the reasoning behind equal 242 
prioritisation: on a societal level, marginal investment in consumption can be substituted with 243 
marginal investment in health. Hence, a steady state relationship should exist between 244 
consumption and health, i.e. the (consumption) value of health should remain constant over 245 
time. 246 
 247 
A second argument is Keeler and Cretin’s postponement paradox [47]. They argue that if 248 
health is discounted at a lower rate than costs, then the cost-effectiveness of a health 249 
investment will improve the further in the future it is postponed, resulting in health 250 
investments being “paralysed” into infinite postponement. This argument has been criticised 251 
as being usually irrelevant since decision makers are typically choosing between competing 252 
priorities to fund from a fixed annual budget, rather than the optimal timing of a given 253 
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investment. Hence the issue of cohorts of patients in different years competing for the same 254 
resources never arises [7,10,48,49].  255 
 256 
The last argument is made by Lipscomb et al. [36] from the perspective of horizontal equity. 257 
Equal discounting preserves “time neutrality” by giving equal treatment to potential 258 
beneficiaries who are alike in every respect except for their position in time relative to the 259 
decision time. The counter-argument is that these beneficiaries are not actually equal because 260 
they live in societies with different income levels, available health technologies and hence 261 
valuations of health [5].  262 
 263 
These arguments assume that the value of health is constant over time. If the relative value of 264 
health increases as society becomes wealthier, then Gravelle and Smith show that the 265 
discount rate for health should be approximately the discount rate for costs less the growth 266 
rate in the value of health [7]. More recently, Claxton et al. [9] developed Gravelle and 267 
Smith’s framework further by suggesting that the validity of differential discounting depends 268 
on whether the decision maker is seeking to maximise welfare or health itself, whether the 269 
budget for health care is fixed and whether the value of health changes over time. They show 270 
that the differential between the discount rate for costs and health can be informed by growth 271 
in either the value of health, or the cost-effectiveness threshold.  272 
 273 
 274 
Individual vs. societal preferences 275 
 276 
Individuals have time preferences that can be elicited using different methods, including 277 
empirical stated preference studies. The social rate of time preference relates to preferences 278 
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of society as a whole for present over future consumption. The appropriate way to establish 279 
this rate, and in particular how it relates to the time preference of individuals, is not 280 
straightforward [2,6]. One approach is simply to treat it as the average of individual time 281 
preferences. However, stated preference studies often [50] (but not always [51]) find that 282 
individual discount rates exceed societal rates. Hence Olson suggests that such studies, if they 283 
are to be used at all, should ask individuals to prioritise based on their preferences about the 284 
temporal distribution of health in society, without foreknowledge about what their position in 285 
that society is [52]. Nevertheless, some economists believe that social decision making 286 
should reflect the aggregation of individual rather than social preferences to avoid overriding 287 
the choices that people make in their individual decisions (the principle of consumer 288 
sovereignty). 289 
 290 
One component of the social discount rate is uncertainty about the possibility of being able to 291 
enjoy the benefits of future consumption. This uncertainty stems from several kinds of risk: 292 
(i) catastrophe risk, the risk that society itself will no longer exist in a form that will allow 293 
these benefits to be enjoyed [28]; (ii) unanticipated risks which may lead to future benefits of 294 
a particular programme not materialising, such as obsolescence due to technological 295 
innovation [28]; (iii) the risk that individuals will not enjoy the future benefits because of 296 
death or another personal catastrophe [5]. The rest of this section discusses some of the 297 
challenges in estimating these risks. 298 
 299 
Of these risks, catastrophe risk is clearly relevant to society, but likely to be smaller than the 300 
risks operating on an individual level. Murray and Acharya suggest it may not exceed 0.1% a 301 
year [53]. Programme-specific risks are also relevant to society, but it would seem difficult to 302 
estimate them by asking individuals to quantify the actual risk (rather than their subjective 303 
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perception of that risk). Tinghög suggests that individual preferences should be overridden in 304 
a case of “myopic preference failure”, where individuals are cognitively unable to process the 305 
information necessary for welfare maximisation, even if the information is technically 306 
available [6]. Parfit [54] suggests that if the reason for discounting is uncertainty about the 307 
future, then the discount rate should be varied based on the risk involved with the particular 308 
programme. Lipscomb et al. [36] argue that programme-level uncertainty has no place in the 309 
discount rate at all, but instead should be incorporated into the expected outcomes of the cost-310 
effectiveness analysis. 311 
 312 
The third risk is that of individual risk of death or catastrophe. Brouwer et al. [5] suggest that 313 
this risk is irrational at a societal level, because some (usually predictable) proportion of 314 
individuals will always live to receive health benefits. Indeed, this risk may be particularly 315 
irrelevant for vaccination programmes due to their positive externalities. As Tasset et al. [11] 316 
point out, individuals may discount future health benefits because they fear not being able to 317 
enjoy them, but the time period in which they were protected from infection still contributes 318 
to societal (herd) protection, and future generations can continue to enjoy this benefit 319 
regardless of whether individuals in the previous generation survive.  320 
 321 
Intra- vs. inter-generational trade-offs 322 
 323 
 324 
As previously mentioned, the long-term effects of vaccines can raise issues around the 325 
distinction between intra- and inter-generational time trade-offs. This distinction has been 326 
made more widely. In Gravelle and Smith’s terminology [7], a distinction should be made 327 
between comparison of health effects of an individual of age a at time t with the same 328 
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individual of age a+1 at time t+1 (intra-generational discounting), and of an individual of age 329 
a at time t with another individual of age a at time t+1 (inter-generational discounting). 330 
Discounting will reduce the value of not only any future health and consumption gains of the 331 
current generation, but also the total value of all the health and consumption of a future 332 
cohort compared to the present one. 333 
 334 
This distinction is particularly important for vaccines. Most economic evaluations of 335 
interventions against non-infectious diseases need only account for the cohort receiving the 336 
intervention, whereas economic evaluations of vaccination often extend the analysis to 337 
include future cohorts in order to better capture indirect benefits (and detriments) such as 338 
herd protection. The health gains of future cohorts through herd protection are contingent on 339 
decisions taken in earlier cohorts. In contrast, for evaluations of treatment, health gains in 340 
future cohorts are independent of decisions made in earlier cohorts. 341 
Intra-generational discounting might legitimately be based on individual time preferences, 342 
while inter-generational discounting involves wider issues of fairness. Future generations 343 
cannot participate in present decisions that will affect them. Schelling argues that pure time 344 
preference measures “emphatic distance”, our preference for people closer to us in time as 345 
they are less familiar and likely to be more different from us [55]. However, Tinghög argues 346 
that it would be unfair to disadvantage them purely because “it will benefit “us” instead of 347 
them” [6]. Sen [56] takes this further (albeit in the context of energy policy) and argues that 348 
future generations have rights to resources that we should not take away, even if their utility 349 
loss is compensated by our gains. 350 
 351 
To incorporate this distinction, Lipscomb [8] proposes “two-stage discounting” in which 352 
health effects in the same individual are discounted back to a common age using an estimate 353 
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of individual time preference, then the individually discounted health effects across all 354 
individuals are discounted back to a common time using the social rate of time preference 355 
(which is lower than the private rate of time preference). 356 
 357 
Non-constant discounting 358 
 359 
Another approach is “slow” or non-constant discounting [57] in which the discount rate 360 
decreases over time, so that it has less effect on distant benefits, which accrue mainly to 361 
future generations. This is motivated from inter-generational concerns [53] and empirical 362 
studies showing that individuals have declining rates of time preference as outcomes become 363 
more distant in time [51,58–61]. The resulting calculations are analytically simpler than two-364 
stage discounting, albeit at the cost of being a more indirect (and less accurate) way of 365 
addressing inter-generational equity. Time-dependent functions proposed for the discount rate 366 
include stepwise, proportional [57], hyperbolic [58] and quasi-hyperbolic [62].  367 
 368 
The UK Treasury recommends stepwise discounting to all public sector bodies [28], but at a 369 
very slowly declining rate (3.5% for the first 30 years, declining to 3.0% from year 31 and 370 
with further declines from year 76); this will only make a perceptible difference in analyses 371 
with effects that span several generations. Murray and Acharya propose an exponentially 372 
declining rate in the short term to reflect concern for proximal generations, and then a 373 
constant (but extremely low) rate thereafter [53]. Westra et al. [15] examined the cost-374 
effectiveness of human papillomavirus vaccination using different several different 375 
discounting models. 376 
 377 
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One objection to “slow discounting” is that it would violate the stationarity property [63]. 378 
Stationarity ensures preference stability i.e. that someone’s time preference for an event will 379 
not change as time advances. However, stationarity is not always observed in stated 380 
preference studies [64,65], and may anyway be practically irrelevant if decisions are binding 381 
for the future. Harvey [57] suggests that individuals can have “multiple selves” in 382 
behavioural decision theory (i.e. consider versions of themselves at different time points to be 383 
separate entities) and hence experience different time preferences. However, even though 384 
individuals may change their mind as an event draws near, the practical consequences of 385 
reflecting this in decision rules have yet to be clarified, and it has yet to be considered 386 
appropriate for policy makers to adopt such a position. 387 
 388 
Timing of risk reduction vs. utility reduction 389 
 390 
Vaccination involves three events separated in time: risk of infection, risk of mortality and 391 
change in life expectancy. Bos et al. [14] has argued that health improvements following 392 
vaccination (and other preventive interventions) should be discounted from the time of 393 
infection risk reduction to the time of the intervention, rather than from when actual life years 394 
or health utilities are gained (i.e. when disease manifestations are prevented). The rationale is 395 
that vaccination is a good consumed for the sake of averting future risk exposure, and the 396 
stream of life years saved as a result is simply a statistical construct. Hence health benefits 397 
should be discounted when the good (vaccination) is used. However, these recommendations 398 
have yet to be adopted in guidelines or used in economic evaluations. 399 
 400 
Going a step further, Lowenstein and Prelec [66] developed the concepts of “savouring and 401 
dread”, anticipated pleasure or pain, to explain why people often prefer to delay pleasant 402 
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outcomes and hasten unpleasant ones. Cohen [67] uses these ideas to suggest that part of the 403 
benefit of preventive interventions includes not only averting future disease, but also gaining 404 
“utility in anticipation”, or anxiety reduction due to decreased risk of a future event. Since 405 
few health risks are certain to occur and individuals are rarely aware of what would have 406 
occurred if a preventive measure had not been taken, he argues that the primary motivation 407 
for taking preventive actions is to reduce the anxiety associated with a risk, rather than to 408 
avert the risk itself. Drummond et al. [16] suggest that at least part of the utility gain from 409 
vaccination should take place from the time of vaccination rather than the time of disease 410 
averted. 411 
 412 
The possibility of losing utility from dread may imply negative pure time preference for 413 
health, because averting future health detriments may be valued more highly the further away 414 
from the present they are (because they are accompanied by a longer period of dread). 415 
Indeed, stated preference studies have found that some people do have zero or negative time 416 
preference [68], particularly for health states perceived as more severe. Others report high 417 
positive time preference, sometimes even higher for health than for consumption [50,51], but 418 
this may reflect “status quo bias” [69] since a person’s stock of health declines over time [7]. 419 
Furthermore, even if a person’s pure time preference is negative, the overall preference may 420 
be positive as a result of the uncertainty component. 421 
 422 
Addressing technical difficulties 423 
 424 
Because economic evaluations of vaccination often involve models with multiple interaction 425 
cohorts, a number of technical difficulties arise when using differential, two-stage or delayed 426 
discounting. O’Mahony et al. [70] demonstrated that the cost-effectiveness of introducing 427 
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vaccination improves as the number of age-cohorts modelled increases under differential 428 
discounting, but not under equal discounting. The issue arises because each successive age-429 
cohort receives vaccination one year later and so is not “start time neutral”, so cost-430 
effectiveness improves with each successive cohort, all else equal. Hence vaccination will be 431 
less cost-effective in a given cohort compared to previous cohorts when discounted back to 432 
the same year.  433 
 434 
Furthermore, zero or negative time preference for health would result in infinite benefits at 435 
finite costs for disease eradication [53], hence justifying virtually unlimited reprioritising of 436 
investments towards eradication. Indeed, zero or negative time preference would have the 437 
same effect for any successful vaccination programme, unless the time horizon was finite, 438 
since the discounted costs and health effects from an infinite number of cohorts need to be 439 
summed up. Setting a finite time horizon is an unsatisfactory solution as it is equivalent to 440 
having a 100% discount rate after a certain time; there does not seem to be any empirical or 441 
methodological justification for this. When time preference for both consumption and health 442 
is positive, an infinite time horizon does not pose methodological difficulties since the 443 
marginal change in discounted costs and health effects with each additional cohort rapidly 444 
diminishes. This problem is a special case of Parfit’s “argument from excessive sacrifice” 445 
[54], in which the lack of positive time preference for benefits may cause the present 446 
generation to sacrifice all its consumption for the sake of future generations. Parfit’s solution 447 
is not to impose a positive time preference, but to incorporate an equity criterion by which 448 
benefits are equitably shared between generations, so that no generation is asked to make too 449 
great a sacrifice for the sake of another. For instance, a boundary condition could be 450 
introduced such that the health of any given generation would not be allowed to fall below a 451 
certain threshold as a result of health resource allocation decisions. 452 
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 453 
Both these problems (cost-effectiveness depending on the number of cohorts modelled, and 454 
infinite benefits for finite costs) can be avoided by using a modification of Lipscomb’s two-455 
stage discounting [8]: discount costs and health effects in each cohort back to the common 456 
age of vaccination using a differential rate, and then discount them for each cohort back to a 457 
common time using the same (possibly negative) societal discount rate. A difficulty arises 458 
because with vaccination, health effects can fall on different cohorts from those receiving the 459 
intervention, so they can be attributed either to the cohort receiving the vaccine, or the cohort 460 
benefitting from the effects. The latter is both technically simpler (avoiding the need to 461 
determine which cohort benefits from which vaccine) and easier to justify, since benefits are 462 
then discounted at the rate received by the cohort in which they fall. A disadvantage of two-463 
stage discounting is the added complexity of the procedure, especially in multi-cohort 464 
models. In environmental and energy policy, simple formulations to achieve the same effect 465 
have been proposed. For instance, Schelling [55] suggests that the pure time preference 466 
element of discounting is removed when considering intergenerational issues. However, 467 
equivalent formulae in health economics are not obvious because improving the health of the 468 
present generation does not reduce the stock of health for future generations in the way that 469 
may happen with natural resources [53]. 470 
 471 
O’Mahony et al. suggest a more convenient solution that can be applied to health: adjust the 472 
cost-effectiveness threshold in multi-cohort models based on the (discounted) incremental 473 
cost-effectiveness ratio of a hypothetical comparator which is just at this threshold when 474 
undiscounted [71]. They also show that the resulting solution is equivalent to the two-stage 475 
discounting scheme described above. 476 
 477 
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Conclusion 478 
 479 
Most economic evaluations of vaccination still discount both costs and health at a positive, 480 
constant, common rate back to a common time. Obviously, any adjustment in the way 481 
vaccine evaluations are discounted needs to be consistent with guidelines for health economic 482 
evaluations in general, while being cognisant of particular consequences for vaccines to do 483 
their distinctive features. Differential discounting appears to be technically sound, more 484 
equitable from an inter-generational perspective than equal discounting, and is already 485 
accepted in some countries as appropriate to all health economic evaluations. Other 486 
adjustments, such as a decreasing rate of discounting or altering the time at which health is 487 
discounted, may also reflect our concern for inter-generational equity and avoiding anxiety 488 
due to a potential future health detriment. Hence there are sound empirical, theoretical and 489 
ethical justifications for considering other departures from standard discounting, although the 490 
technical implications of other proposed adjustments are less well-explored compared to 491 
those for differential discounting. Since economic evaluations of vaccination are particularly 492 
sensitive to discounting, future work to explore such alternatives should consider vaccination-493 
specific issues as part of that enquiry. 494 
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Tables 690 
 691 
Table 1. Glossary of key economic terms used. 692 
 693 
Consumption The final purchase for use of goods or services by individual 
(consumers). 
Cost-benefit analysis A type of economic evaluation in which the incremental costs and 
benefits of an intervention are both expressed in monetary units. 
Cost-effectiveness 
analysis 
A type of economic evaluation in which the incremental costs of 
an intervention are compared to the incremental outcomes of the 
intervention expressed in physical units such as cases of disease 
averted, lives saved or quality adjusted life years gained. 
Discounting Reduction in the value of a future cost or benefit at a pre-specified 
rate, which depends on their temporal distance from a common 
time (such as the time at which an intervention like a vaccination 
programme is initiated). 
Externality Cost or benefit that does not fall on the person producing or 
consuming a good. 
  
Opportunity cost The value of the next best alternative use of resources which is 
foregone when the resources are consumed. 
Social rate of time 
preference 
The rate at which society values present over future consumption. 
 
Standard gamble Method of eliciting the value that individuals place on a health 
state by asking them their preference between being in a health 
30 
 
state, and being in perfect health but with some given risk of 
instant death. 
Stated preference Method of eliciting individuals’ preferences for different options 
by asking them what they would do in hypothetical situations. 
Stationarity Preference between two outcomes that depend only on the time 
interval between them and not on when the first event occurs. 
Time trade-off Method of eliciting the value that individuals place on a health 
state by asking them their preference between a shorter time spent 
in perfect health, and a longer time spent in that health state. 
 694 
 695 
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Table 2. Temporal and generational timing of benefits from four vaccines. 697 
 698 
 Benefits 
Vaccine Present generation  
(present adults) 
Future generations 
(present children) 
Smallpox   
Present (1970) Very small Large 
Future Very small Very large 
Human papillomavirus   
Present (2010) Small Small 
Future Small Large 
Varicella   
Present (2010) Very small Medium 
Future Possibly negative Large 
Paediatric influenza   
Present (2010) Large Small 
Future Very small Very small 
 699 
